Last data update: May 06, 2024. (Total: 46732 publications since 2009)
Records 1-3 (of 3 Records) |
Query Trace: de la Motte Hurst C[original query] |
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Risk Assessment and Management of COVID-19 Among Travelers Arriving at Designated U.S. Airports, January 17-September 13, 2020.
Dollard P , Griffin I , Berro A , Cohen NJ , Singler K , Haber Y , de la Motte Hurst C , Stolp A , Atti S , Hausman L , Shockey CE , Roohi S , Brown CM , Rotz LD , Cetron MS , Alvarado-Ramy F . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2020 69 (45) 1681-1685 In January 2020, with support from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), CDC instituted an enhanced entry risk assessment and management (screening) program for air passengers arriving from certain countries with widespread, sustained transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). The objectives of the screening program were to reduce the importation of COVID-19 cases into the United States and slow subsequent spread within states. Screening aimed to identify travelers with COVID-19-like illness or who had a known exposure to a person with COVID-19 and separate them from others. Screening also aimed to inform all screened travelers about self-monitoring and other recommendations to prevent disease spread and obtain their contact information to share with public health authorities in destination states. CDC delegated postarrival management of crew members to airline occupational health programs by issuing joint guidance with the Federal Aviation Administration.* During January 17-September 13, 2020, a total of 766,044 travelers were screened, 298 (0.04%) of whom met criteria for public health assessment; 35 (0.005%) were tested for SARS-CoV-2, and nine (0.001%) had a positive test result. CDC shared contact information with states for approximately 68% of screened travelers because of data collection challenges and some states' opting out of receiving data. The low case detection rate of this resource-intensive program highlighted the need for fundamental change in the U.S. border health strategy. Because SARS-CoV-2 infection and transmission can occur in the absence of symptoms and because the symptoms of COVID-19 are nonspecific, symptom-based screening programs are ineffective for case detection. Since the screening program ended on September 14, 2020, efforts to reduce COVID-19 importation have focused on enhancing communications with travelers to promote recommended preventive measures, reinforcing mechanisms to refer overtly ill travelers to CDC, and enhancing public health response capacity at ports of entry. More efficient collection of contact information for international air passengers before arrival and real-time transfer of data to U.S. health departments would facilitate timely postarrival public health management, including contact tracing, when indicated. Incorporating health attestations, predeparture and postarrival testing, and a period of limited movement after higher-risk travel, might reduce risk for transmission during travel and translocation of SARS-CoV-2 between geographic areas and help guide more individualized postarrival recommendations. |
A cost-benefit analysis of a proposed overseas refugee latent tuberculosis infection screening and treatment program
Wingate LT , Coleman MS , de la Motte Hurst C , Semple M , Zhou W , Cetron MS , Painter JA . BMC Public Health 2015 15 (1) 1201 BACKGROUND: This study explored the effect of screening and treatment of refugees for latent tuberculosis infection (LTBI) before entrance to the United States as a strategy for reducing active tuberculosis (TB). The purpose of this study was to estimate the costs and benefits of LTBI screening and treatment in United States bound refugees prior to arrival. METHODS: Costs were included for foreign and domestic LTBI screening and treatment and the domestic treatment of active TB. A decision tree with multiple Markov nodes was developed to determine the total costs and number of active TB cases that occurred in refugee populations that tested 55, 35, and 20 % tuberculin skin test positive under two models: no overseas LTBI screening and overseas LTBI screening and treatment. For this analysis, refugees that tested 55, 35, and 20 % tuberculin skin test positive were divided into high, moderate, and low LTBI prevalence categories to denote their prevalence of LTBI relative to other refugee populations. RESULTS: For a hypothetical 1-year cohort of 100,000 refugees arriving in the United States from regions with high, moderate, and low LTBI prevalence, implementation of overseas screening would be expected to prevent 440, 220, and 57 active TB cases in the United States during the first 20 years after arrival. The cost savings associated with treatment of these averted cases would offset the cost of LTBI screening and treatment for refugees from countries with high (net cost-saving: $4.9 million) and moderate (net cost-saving: $1.6 million) LTBI prevalence. For low LTBI prevalence populations, LTBI screening and treatment exceed expected future TB treatment cost savings (net cost of $780,000). CONCLUSIONS: Implementing LTBI screening and treatment for United States bound refugees from countries with high or moderate LTBI prevalence would potentially save millions of dollars and contribute to United States TB elimination goals. These estimates are conservative since secondary transmission from tuberculosis cases in the United States was not considered in the model. |
Costs of, and reimbursement for, vaccines: a case study at the Board of Health Refugee Services in DeKalb county, Georgia
Adachi K , Coleman MS , de la Motte Hurst C , Vargas ML , Oladele A , Weinberg MS . Vaccine 2012 31 (18) 2317-22 BACKGROUND: Approximately 70,000 refugees are resettled to the United States each year. Providing vaccination to arriving refugees is important to both reduce the health-related barriers to successful resettlement, and protect the health of communities where refugees resettle. It is crucial to understand the process and resources expended at the state/local and federal government levels to provide vaccinations to refugees resettling to the United States. OBJECTIVES: We estimated costs associated with delivering vaccines to refugees at the Board of Health Refugee Services, DeKalb county, Georgia (DeKalb clinic). METHODS: Vaccination costs were estimated from two perspectives: the federal government and the DeKalb clinic. Data were collected at the DeKalb clinic regarding resources used for vaccination: staff numbers and roles; type and number of vaccine doses administered; and number of patients. Clinic costs included labor and facility-related overhead. The federal government incurred costs for vaccine purchases and reimbursements for vaccine administration. RESULTS: The DeKalb clinic average cost to administer the first dose of vaccine was $12.70, which is lower than Georgia Medicaid reimbursement ($14.81), but higher than the State of Georgia Refugee Health Program reimbursement ($8.00). Federal government incurred per-dose costs for vaccine products and administrative reimbursement were $42.45 (adults) and $46.74 (children). CONCLUSIONS: The total costs to the DeKalb clinic for administering vaccines to refugees are covered, but with little surplus. Because the DeKalb clinic 'breaks even,' it is likely they will continue to vaccinate refugees as recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices. |
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